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1   Introduction 
 
In many European member states, the production of electricity from renewable energy 
resources has been intensely subsidized in the past decade. The most common support 
systems in EU member states for renewables are feed-in tariffs or a green certificate 
systems with minimum guaranteed prices (European Commission, 2011). These tariffs and 
guaranteed prices should compensate for the higher production costs of renewable 
technologies, relative to conventional sources of electricity production. In table 1 the 
production costs (a levelized cost covering the investment cost 1) of both conventional and 
renewable technologies are presented for 2007. We can see that the production cost for 
onshore wind energy was competitive with the cost of conventional technologies in 2007, 
whereas solar PV was far from achieving grid parity. 
 





                                                          
1
  For more detailed info on these costs, see European Commission, 2008. We are aware that the levelized 
cost of renewables is not the right basis of comparison as the real value of renewable energy production 
depends on the marginal cost of power that it substitutes (Joskow, 2011). In this paper, however, all we 
need are orders of magnitude. 
Table 1: Production Cost of Electricity (2007)
Levelized cost






Onshore wind 75-110 e/MWh
Solar PV 520-880 e/MWh
technologies that are installed in individual houses (solar PV). For instance in Germany, solar PV
was guaranteed the largest nancial support among all renewable energy technologies. In 2009,
the feed-in tari¤ for solar PV in Germany equalled more than four times the feed-in tari¤ paid for
electricity produced by on-shore wind turbines, and more than eight times the electricity price at the
power exchange (Frondel et al. 2010). But also in other European countries, discrimination between
technologies in terms of support levels persists. Table 2 shows the level of support for onshore wind
and solar PV technology in Germany and Flanders, both in the rst year of the support and in
2012.2 The numbers clearly demonstrate the discrimination, which still remains despite the fact
that support for solar PV technology has decreased over the years.34
Table 2: Support for wind and solar over time
Onshore Wind Solar PV
Start year 2012 Start year 2012
Germany 91 e/MWh 89 e/MWh 506 e/MWh 183 e/MWh
Flanders 80 e/MWh 90 e/MWh 450 e/MWh 250 e/MWh
In this paper we show that discrimination in support of di¤erent renewable technologies is inef-
cient. We also study the rationale for politicians in following this strategy in promoting renewable
energy technologies. The objective is to explain the generous support for solar PV in the years right
2The support levels should only be compared within one country or region, as the green certicate system provides
support on top of the electricity price. This is not the case with a feed-in tari¤, which represents the full level of
support.
3Start year wind onshore and solar PV support in Germany was 2000, wind onshore support in Flanders 2004 and
solar PV support in Flanders 2006.
4For Germany these support levels are feed-in tari¤s, for Flanders minimum guaranteed certicate prices. A
comparison of the support levels between countries is thus not straightforward, but the discrimination within the
country or region between technologies is obvious.
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after the introduction of renewable technologies. In terms of technologies, our focus is on onshore
wind and solar PV, where onshore wind represents a centralized, non individualized technology, and
solar PV a decentralized and individualized technology.
We claim that in several EU member states, governments have introduced ine¢ ciently high
subsidies for solar PV panels installed with households, for electoral purposes. The idea behind
this is that incumbent governments can use these subsidies to incentivize indecisive or swing voters
to vote for them in upcoming elections. Our model also shows that it is not only a green party
with extremely high preferences for renewable energy sources that would introduce large support
for renewable technologies.
In Germany, for instance, Helmut Kohls conservative government in the early 1990s initiated
the feed-in tari¤ system. With the introduction of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), the
support regime was amended in 2000 to guarantee stable feed-in tari¤s for up to 20 years, thereby
providing favorable conditions for investments in green electricity production over the long term.
The tari¤s established by the EEG for solar PV were more than four times the feed-in tari¤ for on-
shore wind turbines. (Frondel et al., 2010) In Flanders, the government that introduced the green
certicates (with minimum guaranteed prices) for solar PV was the regional FlandersGovernment-
Leterme I. The majority in this government was formed by 4 parties (the right wing democratic
VLD, the socialist SP, the Flemish Nationalists NVA and the Christian Democrats CD&V), while
at that time the green party served in opposition.
The incumbent coalitions introducing high support for solar PV were re-elected both in Flanders
and in Germany. We also veried whether this has been the case for France, the UK, the Netherlands
and Wallonia. The results are in table 3.
As it is very di¢ cult to separate the e¤ect of introducing support for solar PV from other e¤ects
that play in elections, we only conclude from these stylized facts that there is some indication that
high subsidies for solar PV may be inspired by elections.
The aim of this paper is to explain the discrimination in support for renewables from a political
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Table 3: Re-election of parties introducing discriminatory support
Country/Region Start support Election date Party/coalition (re-)elected?
Germany 2000 2002 yes
France 2003 2004 no
Flanders (Belgium) 2002 2004 yes
Wallonia (Belgium) 2003 2004 yes
United Kingdom 2010 2010 yes
Netherlands 2007 2010 yes
point of view. While there are certainly other reasons for discrimination between di¤erent renewable
technologies, such as lobbying by interest groups for instance, our focus is solely on electoral motives.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we review the relevant literature. In section 3 we
describe the optimal policy that will serve as a comparison for the political equilibrium described
in section 4. In section 5 we conclude.
2 Literature Review
To explain discrimination in the support of RES for di¤erent groups of producers, we can build on
two types of political economy theory. The rst is the traditional lobby group model à la Dixit,
Grossman, Helpman (1997). They develop a common agency model to show how organized special
interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump-
sum taxes or transfers. Aidt (1998) builds upon this model to discuss the political internalization
of environmental externalities. Aidt argues that, in the presence of interest groups, the optimal
environmental taxes deviate from the Pigouvian argument. There is empirical evidence for this kind
of theory in the study of support policies for renewable technologies. Jenner et al. (2013) empirically
verify the impact of private energy interest contributions on the adoption of support for renewable
energy technologies in the US electricity sector. The authors nd that both the adoption rate and the
strength of Renewable Portfolio Standards in US states are positively inuenced by renewable energy
lobby campaign contributions, and negatively by conventional energy lobby campaign contributions.
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Marques et al. (2010) study the motivations driving renewable energy support in Europe. Using a
panel data approach, the authors nd that interest groups favoring traditional energy sources hold
back the use of renewable energy.
The second type of model studies the e¢ ciency of policy choices in a dynamic and democratic
political environment. Besley and Coate (1998) study the e¢ ciency of policy choices in a repre-
sentative democracy. They explain why potentially Pareto-improving public investments may not
be introduced when policymakers are not able to commit to future policy outcomes. In the same
context, Glazer (1989) shows how political decisions may be biased towards policies with long term
e¤ects as politicians are only in power for one or two terms. Biais and Perotti (2002) explain how
the conservative government in the UK uses the privatization of public utilities as a strategy to
remain in power. By allocating signicant share ownership to a targeted section of the population,
strategic privatization can build political support for right-wing parties.
It is the second type of modeling that we apply in this paper. We use the Biais and Perotti (2002)
analysis as a basis for our theoretical model. We explain how an incumbent politician or political
party gives a subsidy to long term investments in solar PV panels with a guaranteed return. In this
way she can commit to a long term green policy and makes sure she creates a long term group of
stakeholders and voters for a green policy. As previously modelled by for instance Alesina (1987)
and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) for a bipartisan setting where parties always align preferences with
their constituencies, we consider a model with two political alternatives: the incumbent coalition
and the opposition. We show that it is in the interest of both the incumbent and the opposition to
promise a subsidy for solar PV. With voters who have no outspoken preference for the opposition
nor the incumbent because they are ideologically neutral, both the incumbent and the opposition
adjust their subsidy policy for solar PV as desired by this group of voters.
Some evidence on the electoral motives of support for solar energy already exists. In their paper,
Comin and Rode (2013) nd strong evidence that individuals that use green technologies are more
likely to become green party voters. They studied election patterns in Germany in the period of
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1998-2009, and found that the di¤usion of domestic PV systems caused 25% of the increment of
green votes. So next to some other drivers of green voting such as occupation, political a¢ liation,
education, income and location, the authors prove that the promotion of solar PV systems has
inuenced the popularity of the Green Party in Germany. This evidence solely focuses on Germany,
but might serve as an indication for the practical evidence of our theoretical model. Of course, more
exhaustive empirical research is necessary to draw larger conclusions on the general validity of our
results.
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3 The social planners solution as benchmark
We derive the socially desirable support system for green technologies that will serve as a benchmark
for the political equilibrium.
We consider a simplied production side for the electricity market and assume an inelastic de-
mand. Electricity is produced by three types of energy sources: conventional energy (e.g. coal,
gas), wind and solar. The conventional energy is polluting, while wind and solar are clean energy
production sources. The conventional resources and wind serve as inputs in utilities to produce elec-
tricity, while solar energy production installations (solar panels) can be installed by the households
to produce their own electricity.5
Production costs for wind and solar electricity production are higher than for the conventional
source, and wind is a more competitive technology than solar.6 If there are no constraints, it is cost
e¢ cient to meet the demand for electricity with the conventional technology alone. If the government
wants a certain part of the electricity production to be generated from renewable sources, it must
incentivize this type of production. The required production subsidy level7 should compensate for
the di¤erence in production costs between the renewable technology and the conventional technology.
Producers are encouraged to exploit all available generating sites until the marginal cost of producing
electricity from wind and solar is equal to the proposed subsidy. The proposed subsidy is then set
at a level that guarantees meeting the production level from those renewable sources that the
government desires.
We assume cooperation among di¤erent economies is not possible (i.e. national sovereignty plays
a dominant role in the design of the support systems, see also Jenner et al. (2013)), so we are in
5The prots of solar electricity production are in the hands of those consumers installing solar panels. In the next
part of the paper, we further elaborate on this.
6This is an assumption based on the cost of both technologies as it was in the rst half of the previous decade.
Since then, the cost of solar PV technology has dropped tremendously, whereas wind technology has not experienced
the same large cost decrease.
7We introduce a production subsidy but any other form of support would t (tendering, renewable quota obliga-
tions, certicate systems with minimum guaranteed prices), as long as it stimulates the production of electricity from
renewable resources.
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a second best situation.8 We do not consider learning e¤ects as these are too small in the case
of a country in isolation. This static setting is close to a Nash non-cooperative setting where each
country takes the knowledge accumulated in the rest of the world as given.
In gure 1, we compare the costs of meeting the target with two types of subsidy schedules.
The welfare loss of using a di¤erentiated subsidy instead of a uniform subsidy to meet the target is
indicated by the colored triangle. For a xed level of electricity production from renewable energy
sources, the loss in welfare from discrimination equals the increase in total production costs of the
renewable target.
Figure 1: Welfare loss from discrimination in support
We can conclude that, from an e¢ ciency point of view, the optimal subsidy scheme to support
di¤erent technologies is uniform, despite the di¤erence in production costs. Given that we do not
observe this uniform pattern of support in practice (cf. supra), there must be reasons to deviate
from the optimal support system that go beyond the economic e¢ ciency objective.
In the following section, we study the justication for discrimination in favor of decentralized
renewable technologies from a political economy point of view. We show that an incumbent coalition
8When we consider a common electricity market between several economies, the rst best solution is full cooper-
ation between all economies in generating the combined required level of renewable electricity. A common support
system would enable trade of renewable energy and learning e¤ects to play a signicant role, such that subsidies
would be set at the most e¢ cient level. In practice, we do not observe a lot of cooperation in support systems, and
there is almost no trade. Every economy decides on the optimal support levels, given the support system of the other
economies. In this non-cooperative perspective, the optimal support levels will be lower than with (full) cooperation
between economies, as learning benets cannot be considered.
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has an incentive to design a support scheme favoring a technology that can be installed at voters
houses in order to increase election chances. This explains ine¢ ciently high subsidies for this type
of technology.
4 Political model
We analyze politically motivated subsidies for decentralized RES in the electricity market in a
bipartisan environment, where the residing government and the opposition are considered. We use
a political setting close to the Biais and Perotti model (2002). The incumbent and the opposition
di¤er in ideology, a permanent feature that cannot be modied as part of the electoral platform.
Next to their ideological characteristics, both incumbent and opposition are electorally accountable
for their subsidy policy for renewable energy. Both want to achieve the same level of renewable
electricity production, but the choice of what technologies to subsidize and at what rate, is at their
discretion. We simplify the analysis by only considering wind and solar PV as renewable sources.
Solar PV is a decentralized technology which can be installed at household level. Wind farms, on
the other hand, are assumed to be organized on a more industrial, centralized level, and are not
available at household level: wind mills are are at too large of a scale to install by individual voters
for self-su¢ cient energy production.9 By introducing a uniform subsidy for solar PV and wind,
the target is met at the lowest cost. The subsidy for solar PV can however be an instrument to
inuence election outcomes. A subsidy for solar PV directly a¤ects voter welfare and can therefore
inuence voting behavior, while a subsidy for wind mills does not have this direct impact. We show
that when an election is due, both the incumbent and the opposition have an interest in setting the
subsidy for solar PV at a level that maximizes their (re-)election chance, instead of considering an
9The capacity of an average solar panel is about 4 kWp, that of an average wind farm 1500 kW. Wind farms that
are owned by groups of households can be considered as a more decentralized technology as well. In Germany and
Denmark, this form of co-operative ownership (or crowd funding) is popular, and has increased the acceptance of
wind energy (Reiche, 2004). In order to obtain the same results as with solar PV at the household sites, the political
parties need to be able to favor the wind farms owned by cooperatives over those owned by industry or by regular
electricity producers.
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Figure 2: Timeline political game
e¢ cient subsidy level.
4.1 Political parties and voters
Both the incumbent government and the opposition maximize the expected value of some exogenous
ego rents, R, which reect the value attached to winning the elections and holding o¢ ce. By setting
a subsidy level for solar PV, both the incumbent and the opposition aim to maximize lR, where
l (l = INC;OPP ) is the probability of winning the election, given the other candidates policy.
There are two periods to consider (cf. gure 2). In period 1, the politicians announce their
subsidy policy for renewable technologies. After the announcement, voters can decide whether they
want to invest in solar PV. Then elections are organized. In period 2, the elected incumbent allocates
the subsidies announced in period 1.
All voters consume electricity, which can be either bought on the market, or produced domesti-
cally with solar panel technology. The installation of solar panels requires a large upfront investment.
Once the panels are installed, the voter consumes electricity for free (maintenance and operational
costs are negligible). The voter becomes a self-su¢ ent electricity producer, and the variable cost of
solar electricity provision is zero. The voters can be subdivided into di¤erent groups, based on 2
dimensions: their political ideology and their installation cost for solar PV.
Concerning the ideological dimension, we introduce a voter-specic parameter that measures a
voters individual ideological bias towards the opposition: i. If i > 0, the voter is ideologically
biased to vote for the opposition, whereas a negative value for i indicates voting behavior that has
a bias towards the incumbent. When i = 0, the voter is ideologically neutral, which means he only
votes based on the announced subsidy for solar PV. We assume that this parameter i has a uniform
11
distribution over the interval
h
  12 ; 12
i
, with density . We also introduce the parameter  that
represents a general shock in the political landscape, which occurs after the policy announcements
of both political parties.10 This parameter can be both positive and negative, and is uniformly
distributed over the interval
h
  12 ; 12 
i
. If  > 0, the shock reforms the political landscape in a way
that is benecial for the opposition; if  < 0, the incumbent party benets from the reform of the
political landscape. The voter specic ideology i is common knowledge, while the general policy
shock is a stochastic element that makes the outcome of the election a random event.
The installation cost of solar PV di¤ers among voters and depends on factors like the location
of their house.11 Therefore the minimal subsidy level to encourage voters to invest in solar panels
di¤ers among the voters. Maintenance and operation costs of solar PV are assumed to be zero.
Each voter has a house in a di¤erent location, and we can rank the houses in order of their relative
productivity regarding a solar panel. If the location is very attractive for solar panel installation,
the subsidy necessary to convince that voter is lower. The installation cost is represented by a linear
function: Ci = a+ bi, where i stands for the ith voter ranked from the most productive to the least
productive roof orientation (i 2 [1; N ] and a; b > 0). So there are N types of voters, based on their
installation cost, and for each of these types of voters, the voters may be ranked based on their
ideological bias towards both parties. This can be seen in gure 3.
10Examples of this type of shock are political scandals or economic crises.
11A house with an inclined roof or a southern facing orientation has a more productive solar panel than one with
a at roof or a northern facing orientation.
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Figure 3: Double categorization of voters
Voters base their voting decision on the announcement of the subsidy for solar PV, and on the
ideologies of the incumbent and the opposition parties. The investment in solar PV is benecial
whenever the discounted cost savings of electricity consumption exceed the investment cost of the
panels. A subsidy for solar PV can convince voters to install the panel, as the subsidy covers the
investment cost. Therefore the voters decision to install a solar panel directly depends on the
subsidy level.
We dene demand for electricity for a representative consumer without solar installation as
Q (P ), with Q0 (P ) < 0.12 We assume that when a solar subsidy is granted to the households,
this is nanced with a mark-up on the electricity price.13 The electricity price thus increases with
the level of subsidy and the number of voters who receive the subsidy. Each voter (household)
that installs solar PV is assumed to le for a subsidy. We dene the price of electricity sold via
the grid as P (S; en), which depends on the subsidy level S and the number of installations en. We
have PS (S; en) > 0 and Pen (S; en) > 0.14 When no subsidy for solar panels is being given, the
price for electricity is P (0; 0). This level is assumed to include support for renewable energy in
the most e¢ cient way. The surplus from consuming electricity is dened as the di¤erence between
12Empirical studies on the demand for electricity point to an elasticity in the range of 0.1 to - 0.2 for households
in the short term (Lijesen, 2007).
13 In practice this mostly comes in the form of a higher distribution tari¤, but we do not model distribution, and a
mark-up in the electricity price creates the same outcomes for the model.
14Where Pi (S; en) is the partial derivative to argument i, i = S; en. The dependence of price on the subsidy level
and the number of voters that receives the subsidy is not linear. This is because the subsidy induces a replacement
of wind by solar PV, such that the base price (P (0; 0) - cf. infra) is then actually lower.
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the willingness to pay for electricity (the demand curve, Q (P )), and the price actually paid for
the electricity. Consumer surplus decreases with the price of electricity. We dene CS (P ), with
CS0 (P ) < 0. When a voter decides to install solar PV on his house, he becomes self-su¢ cient and
no longer has to buy electricity on the market.15 We assume that this voter, from then onwards, has
an inelastic demand for electricity: Q.16 This consumed quantity is xed at the level consumed at
the price of electricity without a mark-up to nance the solar subsidy: Q = Q (P (0; 0)). We dene
the surplus that a voter derives from consuming his own produced electricity as CS (P = 0), as he
no longer pays for electricity (remember maintenance and operation costs are assumed to be zero).








Ui depends on the level of the subsidy. USi stands for the utility when the voter chooses to
install solar panels and UMi for the utility when the voter installs no solar PV and buys electricity
on the market. The former is dened as the sum of subsidy S, consumer surplus from providing
own electricity (CS(P = 0)) and the installation cost of solar (- (a+ bi)):
USi = - (a+ bi)+S+CS(P=0) (2)
and the latter as:
UMi = U
M = CS (P (S; en)) (3)
We now have that Ui = USi if S + [CS(P=0)-CS (P (S; en))]  a + bi, and Ui = UMi if S +
[CS(P=0)-CS (P (S; en))] < a+ bi.
15This is a strong simplication as in reality, even on a yearly average basis, the consumer is not really self-su¢ cient,
because during the winter he will need extra electricity from the grid, and during the summer he puts his additional
electricity on the grid. Using the grid incurs a cost, which is not included in our analysis.
16This is a simplication of reality, as in practice free electricity results in larger consumption. However, support for
solar panels for households is limited to a certain installation capacity per household, so this assumption is realistic.
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4.2 Timing political game
The timing of events is as follows (cf. supra, gure 2). The two political parties, the incumbent
and the opposition, simultaneously and non-cooperatively announce their subsidy for solar PV. We
denote the subsidy announced by the incumbent as SINC and the one by the opposition as SOPP .
At this stage, they know the voterspolicy preferences. They also know the distributions for i
and , but not yet their realized values. The voters, on their part, decide whether or not to invest
in solar panels on their roof. Next the actual value of  is realized and all uncertainty is resolved.
Next the elections are held, and the elected party puts the announced solar PV subsidy into action.
We assume a discount factor of 1 between both periods. The order of events is chosen to resemble
reality.17
4.3 Strategies and political equilibrium









+  + i (4)
We introduce the swing voter, a voter whose ideological bias (), given the subsidies announced by




  U  SOPP    (5)
17 In many European countries we have observed the allocation of very generous subsidies for solar PV for households
over a period of about 15 to 20 years (which is also the payback period for the solar PV technology investment).
This means that once a voter has installed solar PV, based on the promise of long term support, he needs to get this
support over a certain length of time. Over that period, he has an interest to vote for those politicians that promise
to continue paying the subsidies. This idea is captured with the installation decision of solar panels before elections,
and the actual distribution of the subsidy after the election.
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The vote share for both the incumbent and the opposition is a random variable, since  depends
on the realized value of . The density  represents how responsive the voters are to the level of the
subsidy, or in other words, how voters reward the chosen subsidy policy with votes in the upcoming
election.













  U  SOPP  >  (7)
The probability that the opposition wins, is then (1  INC).
The unique equilibrium involves both the incumbent and the opposition converging to the same
subsidy level for solar PV. Indeed, both parties face exactly the same optimization problem. Intu-
itively, both incumbent and opposition share the same preferences (maximizing lR) and therefore
nd the same subsidy announcement optimal.18 This is formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 With probabilistic voting, the equilibrium is characterized by the incumbent and the
opposition announcing the same subsidy level for solar PV.
If a voter does not vote for the incumbent because he has low ideological preferences and does not
benet from the subsidy because he has high installation costs for solar PV, who shall he vote for?
He will not vote for the opposition, as the opposition proposes the same subsidy as the incumbent.
But the opposition must also propose the subsidy, because otherwise the party will face a net loss
of voters (equal to [A (S)   B (S)] - cf. infra). Therefore the solar subsidy is a prisoners dilemma
that can only be avoided by a binding agreement between the two parties.
18Also note that SINC and SOPP enter the maximization problem of both the incumbent and the opposition, and
that the exogenous rents are such that INCR = (1  INC)R.
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We show here that the promise of a certain level of subsidy for solar PV is part of an electoral
strategy, as it directly inuences votersutility function. The subsidy leaves room for convincing
voters that are less ideologically inclined to vote for them, using a subsidy for solar PV as leverage.
In what follows, we show how the subsidy level announced by both parties is determined.
4.4 The equilibrium subsidy level
Suppose that the incumbent proposes subsidy S1. We can then calculate the number of voters
that will be gained and lost as a result of that subsidy proposal. The total number of voters that
invest in a solar installation and vote for the incumbent equals area A + C on gure 4. Area C
represents those voters that ideologically favor the incumbent and have installation costs lower than
the subsidy level. Area A represents those voters that would ideologically vote for the opposition,
but are convinced with a subsidy to vote for the incumbent. For a xed subsidy level, the stronger
the ideological conviction of the voter, the lower the solar installation cost for the voter should be
to convince him to vote for the incumbent. This linear relation This linear relationship causes area
A to be a triangle.
The incumbent will lose area B by proposing subsidy level S1. This area represents the voters
that would ideologically vote for the incumbent, but have an investment cost that exceeds the subsidy
level, making it more attractive for them to vote for the opposition. Voting for the incumbent would
mean they nance the subsidies through a higher electricity bill, so they are better o¤ without a
subsidy and vote for the opposition.









. This is graphically illustrated in gure 4. We
introduce the monetary equivalent of the ideology parameter 
h
  12 ; 12
i
: M . M is dened
such that if the incumbent (opposition) would give an amount of M to the opposition (incumbent)
voters, they would all vote for the incumbent (opposition). Building on this, , as shown in gure
17
4, represents the amount that the incumbent would have to give to the opposition voter with the




S   a+ V
M
(8)
Where S is the subsidy, a the xed installation cost, and V is a constant representing the
consumer surplus advantage of consuming solar based electricity produced at home over buying
electricity on the market:
V = CS(P = 0)  CS(P (0; 0)) (9)
The number of solar panels installed, en, is such that
S   a  ben+ V = 0
which gives us
en = S   a+ V
b
(10)
Similarly, we dene  as the amount the incumbent charges the incumbent voter19 such that the
incumbent (opposition) voters refrain from voting for their ideological candidate - the incumbent










19Consider this amount to be the increase in the electricity bill of those consumers not installing solar panels.
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Figure 4: Incumbent proposes subsidy S1
More generally, the incumbent chooses S in order to maximize the net gain in voters when





and the loss in voters equals
B (S) =  (N   en) (13)
Maximizing this di¤erence gives us the optimal subsidy level:
S =
M + a  V
4
(14)
The subsidy positively depends on the xed cost of installation, a, and on the monetary value of
ideology,M . The subsidy is negatively correlated with the consumer surplus advantage of consuming
electricity produced with solar panels, V .
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4.5 Properties of the equilibrium solar subsidy
We introduce the following propositions.
Proposition 2 The more polarized is society, the higher the optimal subsidy needs to be.
Indeed in the expression of the optimal subsidy level S, we can see that if M increases, S
increases as well (by a factor of 0.25).
If the costs of solar technology are lower, which manifests as a horizontal shift downwards of the
cost function CS = a + bi, the total subsidy cost to convince a similar number of voters decreases.
In fact we then get a new cost function: C 0S = a
0 + bi, with a0 < a. Since the optimal subsidy level
proposed by both the opposition and incumbent in equilibrium positively depends on the installation
cost of solar PV, a lower installation cost results in a lower subsidy. This is formally stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 The optimal subsidy level, for both the incumbent and opposition, decreases with
the cost of technology, CS.
This last proposition is an argument in favor of gradually decreasing subsidy levels over time as
solar technology improves. In order to study these dynamics in more detail, learning e¤ects should
be part of the analysis, but this goes beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Conclusion
Since the early years of support for solar PV, the technology has been allocated very high subsidies
compared to other renewable technologies. This paper develops a political economy theory to explain
the discrimination between di¤erent renewable technologies. We have shown that the design of a
subsidy scheme favoring decentralized technologies (solar PV) relative to centralized technologies
(wind, biomass) can increase election chances. It is in the interest of both the incumbent and
the opposition to promise a subsidy for solar PV. The subisdy is used to convince those of the
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oppositions electorate whom are not strongly ideologically motivated. As the cost of solar PV
technology decreases over time, due to learning e¤ects, for instance, the level of subsidy that needs
to be allocated per household is smaller.
Our theory is in line with stylized facts on subsidy schemes for renewable energy that can
be observed in several European Union member states. Data on the support levels of di¤erent
technologies clearly show the discrimination. The data certainly also indicate the possibility that
discrimination between di¤erent renewable technologies has contributed to electoral victories in
di¤erent European member states and regions.
In future research, it would be of great value to confront our model with data more directly,
performing a comprehensive empirical study.
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